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Abstract: 
This thesis builds on the research on extended immediate deterrence conducted by Huth and Russett 
on one hand an d Lebow and Stein on the other. Several cases are analysed based on the dataset 
compiled by Huth and Russett in order to get a good view on what caused the differences in opinion of 
Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein . In this research I’ve tried to find out whether the different 
views have affected the different outcome classifications. First the focus is on three cases on which 
both sets of researchers have agreed and then the focus is on the six cases on which the researchers 
don’t agree. The difference in cases should provide a clear outlook on what caused these differences in 
coding.  
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Introduction 
 
Deterrence theory appeared in waves and made its real rise during the Cold War years. Even though 
it’s an influential school of thought within the study of international relations, there have been heated 
debates about deterrence theory (Jervis, 1974, p. 289). Deterrence takes on an important role in 
international relations, it’s studied endlessly but it’s still difficult to comprehend.  
 
The debate between Huth and Russett on one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other was a heavily 
debated one. They have disagreed on several points. Huth and Russett released a dataset containing 
fifty-four cases in which, according to them, extended deterrence encounters took place, these cases all 
fall within a certain time period. Huth and Russett classified their selected cases of extended 
immediate deterrence as either a deterrence success or a deterrence failure. Lebow and Stein didn’t 
agree with the classification of the cases as done by Huth and Russett. They have reclassified these 
cases and found extended immediate deterrence to be present in only nine of the original fifty-four 
cases. However, once one notices that these researches have agreed on the definitions of extended 
immediate deterrence and deterrence success, the different outcomes of their research are surprising 
(Fearon, 2002, p. 6). Huth and Russett wanted to put together an expected-utility model and test this 
on their cases, thus causing them to look at all cases as if every case only contained one deterrence 
encounter while Lebow and Stein had used a case-by-case analysis which led them to examine every 
case individually looking for all encounters in each case thus giving a more in-depth analysis.  
In short, Lebow and Stein didn’t agree with the dataset that Huth and Russett presented and they also 
disagreed on the coding of the extended immediate deterrence cases. Lebow and Stein state that 
“analysts of deterrence concur that a widely agreed-upon data base is a critical prerequisite for testing 
competing theories of deterrence and conflict management. Without a data base of cases of deterrence 
that is regarded as valid and replicable by the community of scholars it is impossible to test competing 
theories, much less resolve their differing predictions.” (Lebow and Stein, 1990, p. 340). It is 
important to find out what caused the difference in coding the extended immediate deterrence 
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outcomes. This could help constitute a database that is considered valid and replicable by all 
researchers. This is also necessary because, according to Lebow and Stein as cited above, it’s not 
possible to conduct research or to test a theory on a database that’s not considered valid or replicable. 
Therefore, I will try to find out what has caused Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein to code and 
classify their cases differently. My research question will be the guideline for my research. This 
research question will be: ‘Can the different views of Huth and Russett on one hand and Lebow and 
Stein on the other explain the differences in outcomes in their research on deterrence encounters?’  
 
Research design 
 
It’s important to take a closer look at what has caused these researchers to have such different 
outcomes of their research.  It is obvious the discrepancy is immense and in an effort to solve this 
discrepancy it’s necessary to look into this very carefully. Huth and Russett had compiled a dataset 
and coded the cases which was subsequently rejected by Lebow and Stein. These cases are coded as 
“(1) not a deterrence encounter; (2) not extended deterrence; (3) missed success; (4) compellence; (5) 
defies simple classification; and (6) ambiguous encounters (Lebow and Stein, 1990, p. 356). In this 
research, I’ll try to detect what caused differences between Huth and Russet and Lebow and Stein. In 
order to do this carefully, cases have to be analysed and thus case studies will be conducted. In my 
opinion this is way of researching suits the purpose of this thesis best as it’s my objective to detect the 
cause of difference in opinion. There’ll be an analysis made of cases they do agree on and cases they 
disagree on. Some of the differences can be expected due to their different views on research. Huth 
and Russett apply a social scientific view on research while Lebow and Stein use a historical view on 
research. Firstly, the cases on which there’s agreement are important to look into as this can give some 
sort of common ground and this can give some insight in what aspects they do agree on. However, 
after establishing the area of agreement, it’s important to detect what aspects they disagree on and see 
where the difference in opinion actually lies. Furthermore, I have chosen not to eliminate all the cases 
that Huth and Russett have identified as extended immediate deterrence cases and Lebow and Stein 
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haven’t because the difference in opinion on these cases could also give some insights in where their 
coding would eventually differ.  
Methodology 
 
Thus, I have selected three cases on which Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein have the same 
opinion and thus coded them in the same manner and six cases they don’t agree on.  The cases they 
agreed on are: Germany (attacker) vs. France (protégé) and Britain and Russia (defenders) in 1914 
(deterrence failure) and Germany (attacker) vs. Poland (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders) in 
1939 (deterrence failure) and China (attacker) vs. Vietnam (protégé) and USSR (defender) in 1979. 
 
The cases they disagreed on are: Germany (attacker) vs. Venezuela (protégé) and United States 
(defender) in 1902/1903, Germany (attacker) vs. Czechoslovakia (protégé) and Britain and France 
(defenders) in 1938, India (attacker) vs. Goa (protégé) and Portugal (defender) in 1961, Turkey 
(attacker) vs. Cyprus (protégé) and Greece (defender) in 1964, North Vietnam (attacker) vs South 
Vietnam (protégé) and United States (defender) in 1964/1965, Panama (attacker) vs. Costa Rica 
(protégé) and United States (defender) in 1921 and the Soviet Union (attacker) vs. West Berlin and 
West Germany (protégé) and United States (defender) in 1948-1949.  
 
In order to examine the selected cases carefully, several case studies will be carried out to get a good 
perspective on the cases. After this examination the coding can be analysed and looked into. The 
research will be conducted on several of cases and the comparison between Huth and Russett and 
Lebow and Stein will be made. However, this thesis will first have an explanation of the research 
design and methodology. Second, it will contain a theoretical framework in which concepts and other 
theories used in this thesis will be explained. Also, the debate between Huth and Russett and Lebow 
and Stein will be analysed. When all this information has been provided, the actual research will 
commence.  
The research mainly focuses on the different views between Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein. 
Huth and Russett use a quantitative research method while Lebow and Stein use a qualitative research 
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perspective. Thus, Huth and Russett use a social scientific perspective and Lebow and Stein use a 
historical perspective.  
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Before discussing the debate between Huth and Russett on one hand and Lebow and Stein on the 
other, it’s important to determine some concepts. This is important as it should be clear what the 
concepts really embody and there’s a consensual understanding of what the concepts entail. First of 
all, the deterrence concept should be broken down. According to Morgan the point of deterrence is that 
A can prevent B from doing something A doesn’t want it to do by threatening B to do something that 
could harm them in a serious matter if B proceeds to do this (Morgan, 2003, p.1). Huth defines 
deterrence, based on work by Michael Howard, as A tries to persuade B that when B tries to solve a 
political conflict with force will cause A to retaliate with force and that the costs for B will outweigh 
their benefits (Huth, 1988, p.15).  However, a serious distinction needs to be made between deterrence 
on one hand and compellence on the other. Both compellence and deterrence are seen as coercive 
diplomacy (Morgan, 2003). Deterrence and compellence are both dependent on threats to motivate the 
opposite party but the nature of the threats differ. Deterrence wants to stop the opposite party from 
acting while compellence needs the opposite party to actually undertake action. (Schaub, 2004).  
Schelling states that deterrence uses threats to keep something from happening while compellence 
uses threats to force someone to do something (Herring, 1995, p.14). This means that in the deterrence 
case as in the compellence case, the actors want to achieve something but when using deterrence, one 
doesn’t want their adversary to do something whereas in the compellence case, one does want its 
adversary to act upon something to achieve their goal. The concept of compellence is that A wants to 
stop B from doing something unwanted or to make B do something B wasn’t doing before with the 
use of threats. (Morgan, 2003, p.2). Deterrence isn’t considered as difficult as compellence because 
it’s harder to stop people from doing something they have already started doing than stopping people 
from doing something they weren’t already doing. However, Danilovic states that it may be difficult 
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sometimes to distinguish compellence and deterrence because states often use both at the same time 
(Danilovic, 2002, p. 48). The distinction between these two concepts is very important as it’s 
important to understand what one means by deterrence or compellence when it’s to be discussed in 
this thesis.  
However, the distinction between deterrence and compellence is not the only distinction that needs to 
be made. Morgan has acknowledged not only deterrence but also general deterrence and immediate 
deterrence. Morgan has made this distinction between general deterrence and immediate deterrence. 
Morgan defined immediate deterrence as an relation between two countries in which country A 
considers executing an attack while country B is trying to prevent this attack of A with the use of 
threats. General deterrence relates, according to Morgan, to opposite parties who both maintain armed 
forces to keep their relationship to each other balanced but these parties aren’t seriously considering 
executing an attack. (Morgan, 1983, p. 28). Later, in his 2003 book, Morgan spoke of the distinction 
between general and immediate deterrence again stating that a situation involving immediate 
deterrence can be seen as a crisis with a good possibility of a war whereas a general deterrence 
situation because the attack is still hypothetical (Morgan, 2003, p. 9).  
In addition to this Paul Huth has acknowledged extended deterrence and extended-immediate 
deterrence. Huth defined extended deterrence as a situation in which a defender starts to threaten a 
possible attacker with military charges against the possible attacker in order to prevent the attacker 
from attacking the ally or protégé of the defender. The essence of extended deterrence lies in the fact 
that the defender isn’t threatening the attacker in order to prevent an attack on their own territory but 
to prevent an attack on the territory of their ally (Huth, 1988, p. 16).  
Huth has based his ideas of extended-immediate deterrence on the ideas of Patrick Morgan. However, 
Huth highlights a difference between extended deterrence and extended-immediate deterrence. The 
latter is a situation in which the possible attacker seriously considers the use of force against the 
protégé or the defender, the defender is aware of the threat that the possible attacker is mounting. The 
defender also acknowledges the possibility of the threat or chooses to move their military forces in 
order to prevent the attack (Huth, 1988, p. 16). Lebow and Stein state that both them and Huth and 
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Russett agree that immediate extended deterrence only happens when an attacker considers the use of 
military forces against a country threatened with the possible attack (Lebow and Stein, 1990, p. 342). 
Danilovic also gave a definition of direct deterrence and extended deterrence. According to Danilovic, 
direct deterrence is the avoidance of an attack on the home territory of the deterring country and 
extended deterrence is the act of country A trying to deter an attack by country B on the home territory 
of an ally, country C (2002, p. 52) . 
Because this research also covers qualitative and quantitative research, these concepts will be 
explained once more too. Bryman defines qualitative research as research that ‘usually emphasizes 
words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. As a research strategy it is 
inductivist, constructionist and interpretivist, but qualitative researchers do not always subscribe to all 
three of these features.’. Quantitative research, according to Bryman, ‘usually emphasizes 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data. As a research strategy it is deductivist and 
objectivist and incorporates a natural science model of the research process, but quantitative 
researchers do not always subscribe to all three to these features.’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 714-715).  
 
The debate between Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein. 
 
This thesis mainly focuses on the debate between Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein concerning 
the dataset Huth and Russett have created in their article “What makes deterrence work?”. The dataset 
was published in their 1984 article and later on revised in the article they have published in 1988. The 
dataset contained extended deterrence cases in the time period from 1900 to 1980. The goal of the 
dataset originally was to test an expected utility model of deterrence on several cases of extended 
immediate deterrence (Huth and Russett, 1984). The dataset Huth and Russett provided in 1984 was 
corrected in 1988. Some cases were added to this dataset; however, some were also left out of the 
corrected dataset without any explanation whatsoever (Huth and Russett, 1988). 
Lebow and Stein rejected the dataset composed by Huth and Russett almost in its entirety. Whereas 
Huth and Russett used this dataset to test their expected utility model in a social scientific perspective, 
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Lebow and Stein applied the historical perspective. Lebow and Stein conducted several case studies 
and so used a qualitative approach to the research of extended immediate deterrence. Using the 
qualitative approach, Lebow and Stein argued that only nine of the fifty-four cases could be qualified 
as extended immediate deterrence cases. The other cases couldn’t be qualified as extended immediate 
deterrence cases because Lebow and Stein qualified them for example as compellence success, not a 
deterrence encounter and so on. However, they have also stated that due to the non-replicability of 
Huth and Russett’s dataset, they weren’t able to replicate the data and conduct the research the same 
way Huth and Russett have done. Lebow and Stein discovered that, according to their own research, 
only nine of the fifty-four cases could be regarded as extended immediate deterrence and in thirty-
seven of the fifty-four cases the researches weren’t able to find any evidence of intention to use force 
or the practice of deterrence. Four other cases were coded as ambiguous or as compellence as 
mentioned earlier. The intention to use force by the attacker and the practice of deterrence by the 
defender are critical in the detection of deterrence according to Lebow and Stein. Another point of 
critique from Lebow and Stein is that Huth and Russett have changed their original dataset. The new 
dataset contained cases that were new altogether, cases that were coded differently and some cases 
were simply left out. Huth and Russett haven’t provided a reason for this omission. According to 
Lebow and Stein these shortcomings weren’t alone because they have also found that in some cases 
the labels of attacker, defender or protégé were wrongly appointed. (Lebow and Stein, 1990).  
The most striking part of all this is how four researches can research the same thing, use the same 
definitions but reach such different conclusions. Lebow and Stein state that the different definitions of 
immediate deterrence may cause their outcomes to differ, however they also state that they share the 
same definition of deterrence. The difference is that they don’t agree on the application of the 
definition. As they stated, they still have rejected a lot of the cases Huth and Russett have classified as 
deterrence encounters. Another part Lebow and Stein and Huth and Russett disagreed on is how to 
operationalize the intention to attack. Huth and Russett assume that the threat to attack is the same as 
the intention to attack while Lebow and Stein disagree on this part because they believe a country can 
try to threaten other countries and hope they achieve their goals by threatening or bluffing. Beside the 
intention to attack, the practice of deterrence by the defender is also a necessary condition. However, 
12 
 
Lebow and Stein state that the defender has to make a public commitment to defend itself and maybe 
to punish the attackers. It is very difficult to come across these attempts to practice deterrence and if 
that’s not present, it’s not a case that can be included because it’s not a deterrence encounter. Huth and 
Russett have used a different definition for deterrence failure than Lebow and Stein have. However, 
these differences in their definitions weren’t that enormous for their outcomes to differ that much from 
each other (Lebow & Stein, 1990).  
The definitions of deterrence failure and deterrence success are important for the rest of the research. 
Huth and Russett have defined deterrence success as follows: “(1) the attacker does not resort to any 
use of force and does not coerce the protégé/defender into capitulating his demands, or (2) the attacker 
resorts to the limited use of force (up to 200-250 fatalities) but is unable to force the protégé/defender 
into capitulate.”. Huth and Russett have defined deterrence failure as “cases in which the attacker 
either attained his policy goals under the threat of force or resorted to sustained and large-scale use of 
force” (Huth & Russett, 1990, 490). This definition was later on changed by Huth and then defined 
deterrence failure as “those cases in which the potential attacker commits its armed forces on a large 
scale and in sustained combat against the defender and protégé (totalling more than 200 fatalities) or 
the forces the defender to accede to its demands under the threat of war” (Huth & Russett, 1988, p. 
27). 
Several explanations are offered for the variance in coding the deterrence outcomes. One of the first 
Lebow and Stein offer is that Huth and Russett often conflate the outcome of the deterrence situation 
with the outcome of the conflict, this caused them to code some cases as success while others have 
coded it as failure. Another explanation offered is that Huth and Russett were biased without even 
knowing it. Because of the secondary sources, they have just assumed that the Soviet Union, Vietnam 
or China were always the aggressors because of the bias in the Western sources. The last explanation 
that Lebow and Stein offer is the use different data for the research. The different data can paint a 
certain image of a case which doesn’t necessarily have to be true (Lebow and Stein, 1990).  
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Case studies 
 
As mentioned before, Huth and Russett released a dataset in 1984 containing deterrence encounters up 
to that point. However, in 1988 they have decided to change the composed dataset and they have 
added some cases to the dataset, taken some cases off the dataset. This was all done without any 
explanation which can cause the research of Huth and Russett to seem less reliable because of their 
lack of justification of their modification for their new dataset. Lebow and Stein have first analysed 
the data of the 1984 dataset. This dataset contained 54 cases and Lebow and Stein could only find an 
immediate extended deterrence encounter in 9 of the 54 cases. They couldn’t classify 37 other cases as 
deterrence encounters because necessary conditions for deterrence weren’t present according to 
Lebow and Stein. The 1988 dataset was somewhat different: sixteen cases were absent from the 
second dataset, thirteen cases were added to the dataset and five of the thirty-eight cases they kept in 
the dataset, were coded in a different way. Even though the dataset was adjusted by Huth and Russett 
without naming this fact, the problems didn’t disappear out of the dataset. Of the new cases, only one 
could be coded as a deterrence encounter. Moreover, of the now fifty-one cases dataset, only 10 cases 
can be classified as deterrence encounters. This new dataset also excluded three cases that were 
regarded by Lebow and Stein as extended deterrence cases. Lebow and Stein conducted their research 
on the cases that were present in both the 1984 dataset and the 1988 dataset. Their findings didn’t 
match the findings of Huth and Russett. Listed below are the cases selected for this research. 
 
Year Attacker Protégé Defender Huth & 
Russett 
Lebow & 
Stein 
1902/1903 Germany Venezuela United States Deterrence 
success 
Not a 
deterrence 
encounter 
1914 Germany France Britain and 
Russia 
Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
failure 
1921 Panama Costa Rica United States Deterrence Direct 
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success compellence 
success 
1938 Germany Czechoslovakia Britain and 
France 
Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
failure and 
short-lived 
deterrence 
success 
1939 Germany Poland Britain and 
France 
Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
failure 
1948/1949 Soviet Union West Berlin 
and West 
Germany 
United States Deterrence 
success 
Not a 
deterrence 
encounter 
(first phase); 
insufficient to 
code (second 
phase). 
1961 India Goa Portugal Deterrence 
failure 
Direct 
deterrence 
failure 
1964 Turkey Cyprus Greece Deterrence 
failure 
Direct 
deterrence 
failure 
1979 China Vietnam USSR Deterrence 
failure 
Deterrence 
failure 
 
The data in this table is based on the datasets provided by Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein. 
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Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein have agreed on several cases, not as much as they disagreed on 
however. Firstly, an analysis on the three cases they agree on will be made.  
In the three cases Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein agree on (Germany (attacker) vs. France 
(protégé) and Britain and Russia (defenders) in 1914 (deterrence failure) and Germany (attacker) vs. 
Poland (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders) in 1939 (deterrence failure) and China (attacker) 
vs. Vietnam (protégé) and the Soviet Union (defender) in 1979 (deterrence failure)), the cases were all 
coded as a deterrence failure. In these cases, the defenders weren’t willing to defend their own 
territory but were willing to use military force in order to prevent the attacker from attacking the 
territory of their protégé. In order for this extended deterrence to work, the threats of the defender need 
to be credible to the attacker. The attacker must believe that the defender would actually use force in 
order to stop them from attacking the protégé. The commitment of the defender to protect the protégé 
must be very clear (Danilovic, 2002). 
 
Germany (attacker) vs. France (protégé) and Britain and Russia (defenders) in 1914. 
 
When Europe was on the verge of the first World War, France and Russia were allies and at the end of 
July Germany requested that Russia would stop mobilizing their army and France to promise not to go 
to war with Germany if Germany was to go to war with Russia. These German wishes weren’t 
honoured and subsequently Germany declared war to Russia while France started its military 
mobilization as France had promised its full support of Russia in case the war would occur. Following 
this, Germany declared war to France, Britain was also committed to defending France and thus 
declared war to Germany (Hamilton & Herwig, 2003). France, Britain and Russia became the allied 
when they agreed not to make peace with Germany if the other two countries weren’t going to either. 
In the light of the possible invasion of Germany in France, the British also got involved. With Russia 
already as it’s defender, Britain was soon added to the list. However, this deterrence wasn’t very 
successful as Germany still invaded France (Encyclopaedia , n.d.). 
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Germany (attacker) vs. Poland (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders) in 1939. 
 
In 1939, after Germany had occupied all of Czechoslovakia, Hitler was planning on taking Poland too. 
Since Poland was flanked on three sides by Germany since the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the 
Polish could be attacked from practically any side.  
After some British reluctance at first, Chamberlain announced that if the Polish independence was to 
be threatened and Poland deemed it necessary to retaliate to this threat of their independence with 
military forces, Britain would lend the Polish a hand and would defend them with all their power.  
This meant that both France and Britain would back Poland in case of a German invasion. 
Chamberlain was convinced that Hitler wouldn’t risk going to war with both France and Britain while 
equally invading Poland. The deterring of Germany didn’t work and Germany invaded Poland in 
September of that year (Harrison, 2011). 
 
China (attacker) vs. Vietnam (protégé) and USSR (defender) in 1979. 
 
In 1978 Vietnam signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. This peace treaty meant that in the case 
of a military attack on either of those countries, there would be mutual military support. However, 
knowing this the Chinese did launch a full attack on the Vietnam borders. The fact that China 
launched this attack whilst knowing of the extent of the Soviet-Vietnamese relation. China was in no 
way intimidated by the Soviet support that Vietnam had at that time which leads to the conclusion that 
the deterrence failed in this case (Yee, 1980).  
 
In the three cases above, the defenders attempted to mount a credible threat to the attacker. In the first 
two cases Britain and Russia and later Britain and France made clear that the y were willing to attack 
if Germany proceeded with its plans. This however didn’t stop Germany. In the Sino-Vietnamese war, 
the Chinese also knew of the willingness of Russia to attack if China would attack Vietnam. In this 
case the deterrence failed too.  
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As stated before, the definition of deterrence failure by Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein are 
quite similar. One big difference Lebow and Stein point out is that Huth and Russett see the threat to 
attack as a country also having the intention to attack. Lebow and Stein don’t agree with this as stated 
before. They state that the country could also be bluffing and isn’t willing to use military force  
Deterrence fails when there’s military force involved and when there’s more than 200-250 fatalities. In 
all three cases listed above, there was military force involved and this resulted in more than 200 to 250 
fatalities, thus the act of deterrence failed (Lebow and Stein, 1990) (Huth and Russett, 1988).  
The fact that these researchers agree on the coding of these cases can also be caused by the fact that 
there was a lot of information available about these encounters. These encounters eventually led to 
some of the biggest wars the world has known up until now because of this there’s a lot of information 
about these encounters thus the researchers had plenty of information available before the cases were 
coded. 
 
Germany (attacker), Venezuela (protégé) and the United States (defender) in 1902/1903). 
 
This case is one of the oldest deterrence cases that Huth and Russett have listed. They have listed this 
case as a deterrence success while Lebow and Stein state that this case cannot be classified as a 
deterrence encounter.  Edmund Morris states that the United States, in that period, had started to see a 
pattern in which the Latin American countries weren’t able to pay off their debts (Morris, 2002). Great 
Britain and Germany both had yet to receive large sums of money that Venezuela owed them. Because 
this reimbursement was taking too long for their liking, Britain and Germany weren’t too patient 
anymore and were inclined to pressure Venezuela into repayments. However, Venezuela didn’t make 
the deadline the two countries had set which subsequently led to an attack on the Venezuelan navy and 
later on Britain and Germany put up a blockade (Danilovic, 2002). 
The United States intervened in the situation, Morris states this was because they feared of a German 
invasion in Venezuela which would lead to German occupation of Venezuela. The USA wasn’t 
particularly happy with the Germans having territory in their backyard according to Morris (2002). 
With their intervention, the U.S.A. proposed that all countries that still had to get reimbursements by 
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Venezuela were to get equal treatment. Germany and Great Britain didn’t want equal treatment but 
wanted to be on top of the list to get reimbursed. According to Danilovic, this caused the American 
fleet to be send towards Venezuela, the approaching American fleet scared off both Great Britain and 
Germany and this caused them to accept the original proposal of the United States (Danilovic, 2002). 
Based on this data one could state that the United States have successfully deterred Germany making 
it a successful extended deterrence encounter.  
 
Panama (attacker), Costa Rica (protégé) and United States (defender) in 1921. 
 
Huth has analysed the Costa Rica border dispute. The three countries that were involved were the 
United States, Panama and Costa Rica. Panama was classified as the attacker, Costa Rica as the 
protégé and the United States as the defender. According to Huth and Russett this case can be coded as 
an extended immediate deterrence success while Lebow and Stein state that this is a direct 
compellence success. The United States and Panama signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty which 
meant that the U.S. had exclusive canal rights to the Isthmus of Panama while Panama could count on 
payments for this from the U.S. and the U.S.A. had promised to protect the new republic in case this 
was necessary (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). Because of the Treaty, Panama counted on the support 
of the United States in the dispute over the village Coto. However, Costa Rica sent troops to occupy 
the Panamanian village of Coto, this would classify Costa Rica as the attacker instead of Panama. In 
this case, Panama would be the protégé and protection of the United States was widely expected in 
Panama. The United States didn’t intervene and let Costa Rica occupy Coto. This means that not 
Panama successfully deterred the United States but that Costa Rica successfully deterred the United 
States.   
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Germany (attacker) vs. Czechoslovakia (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders) in 1938. 
 
Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein have both listed this case as a deterrence failure, however 
Lebow and Stein added a short-lived deterrence success to it.   
This crisis erupted when Hitler expressed his desire to annex Sudetenland because of the majority of 
German inhabitants. Sudetenland, at that time, housed about 3 million Germans and Sudeten. 
Czechoslovakia assumed that the French would protect them but neither France or Britain was actually 
looking to protect Czechoslovakia. Both countries wanted to do anything to prevent a war with 
Germany. The Munich Agreement saw Britain and France give in more and more to Hitler’s demands. 
Eventually this led to the signing of the Munich Agreement, this Agreement allowed the Germans to 
occupy all of Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia was only informed after the signing. Chamberlain was 
convinced that peace was made and a military confrontation with Germany was dodged 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). However, the Munich Agreement didn’t mean peace at all as Hitler 
occupied Czechoslovakia in March 1939. As stated earlier on, Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein 
coded this case as a deterrence failure but Lebow and Stein also coded it as a short-lived deterrence 
success. Deterrence is successful if country A could keep country B from doing something unwanted 
by threating the use of force and thereby having country B fear that the costs outweigh the benefits of 
their act. France and Britain weren’t willing to fight a war in Czechoslovakia’s defence. The 
deterrence already failed there because the threats of Britain and France weren’t enough and 
eventually resulted in the Munich Agreement and thus the annexation of Sudetenland by Germany. 
The failure in deterrence in the case of Germany is clear, however what remains unclear is why Lebow 
and Stein have coded this case as a short-lived deterrence success as well. After Hitler had annexed 
Sudetenland through the Munich Agreement, he waited several months to take all of Czechoslovakia. 
From this perspective this can be coded as a short-lived deterrence success and Lebow and Stein argue 
that Hitler was deterred for a short while. (Lebow and Stein, 1990). Huth states that the French and 
British forces weren’t able to defend Czechoslovakia or intervene in the situation in which Germany 
attacked Czechoslovakia. Hitler was also reported to have said that “England bluffs and plays for 
time…. A British attack is not to be expected.”. Later on, Huth also states that Hitler’s primary goal 
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was to eliminate Czechoslovakia as a possible threat without using any force. Thus, due to the Munich 
Agreement in which Germany could annex Sudetenland without any force, Hitler had gotten exactly 
what he desired. The threats Britain and France mounted weren’t credible threats at all to Germany. 
The verbal warnings weren’t credible enough to scare off Hitler (Huth, 1988). Lebow and Stein 
divided this case in not one but two encounters by the first being a deterrence success and the second a 
deterrence failure, Huth and Russett see only one encounter and see this as a failure. Eventually the 
deterrence failed so this isn’t a case of who is wrong or right about this one but how closely one 
looked into the case. 
 
Soviet Union (attacker) vs. West Berlin and West Germany (protégé) and United States (defender) in 
1948-1949. 
 
West Germany was dropped from the dataset of Lebow and Stein in their second dataset. Huth and 
Russett have classified this case as a deterrence success while Lebow and Stein once again do not 
agree and list this case as not a deterrence encounter in the first phase and in the second phase argue 
that there’s insufficient evidence to classify it as anything. Therefore, Lebow and Stein state that this 
case is an ambiguous case. Lebow and Stein state that they would like to split this case into two 
phases. The first phase contains the blockades of the Soviet Union in the Western sectors while the 
second phase is the decision of the Soviet Union to leave the Anglo-American effort to resupply the 
city by air be (Lebow and Stein, 1990). According to George and Smoke, deterrence is easiest when 
it’s clear who acts as the defender and the initiator. When this distinction is clear, it’s clear whether the 
initiator is engaged in trying to aggrandize in an unjustified way (George and Smoke, 1974). However, 
this case is not that simple or that black and white. In the first phase, the Soviets began their 
blockades. These blockades commenced with little blockades such as stopping the allied military 
trains to West Berlin. Following this, the Soviets eventually held a full blockade which was triggered, 
according to George and Smoke, by the idea of the allies to change the currency in West Germany 
(George and Smoke, 1974). According to Danilovic, the Russians left a conference due to feeling 
diverged when the British and Americans worked together to unite Germany again and to help the 
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recovery of the German economy. Consequently, small blockades started after this but when this 
didn’t lead to the wanted result, the Russians imposed a full blockade. After several months, the 
Russians lifted the blockade again (Danilovic, 2002). Lebow and Stein did try to explain the actions of 
the Soviets. According to Lebow and Stein in the second phase of this crisis, Stalin was only interested 
in Berlin and wanted to keep a hold on this city as a political leverage. They also claim that a widely 
accepted opinion is that maybe even the Western states have deterred the Soviets because the airlift 
worked, thus they ceased to carry out the blockades (Lebow and Stein, 2002). It’s difficult to code this 
case correctly when not all information about this case is available which could have been a reason for 
Huth and Russett to leave this case out of the second dataset they composed or they could have 
labelled it as “insufficient evidence to code”.  It is relevant to know as well which cases cannot be 
coded due to the insufficient amount of evidence.  
 
India (attacker) vs. Goa (protégé) and Portugal (defender) in 1961. 
 
This case was labelled by Huth and Russett as an extended deterrence failure but Lebow and Stein 
depicted this case not as an extended deterrence encounter but rather as a direct deterrence failure. 
Thus, both research teams agreed that the deterring aspect of this case failed. However, the 
disagreement is in the direct or extended part of deterrence. From Lebow and Stein’s paper, it 
immediately becomes apparent why they disagree. According to Lebow and Stein, Goa was a province 
of Portugal. This precisely marks the difference between extended and direct deterrence because if 
Goa was a province of Portugal at the time, Portugal would have been defending its home territory, 
thus it would have been direct deterrence (Lebow and Stein, 1990).  
In that time frame, India was looking to find independence for the whole subcontinent. This meant 
taking territory from not only Portugal but also from France and Britain. Britain was regarded as the 
biggest power so the Indian objective was to get the British to quit India first which would make 
France and Portugal follow suit. However, Portugal didn’t leave India as easy as India had initially 
expected. During that time Portugal also joined the NATO and thus had a lot of powers on their side. 
Portugal released a statement with the NATO that Goa was considered a Portuguese province. With 
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Portugal using the NATO to their advantage, India started to fear that more countries like Portugal 
would use the NATO to keep their colonies. Article 73 of the UN Charter stated that UN members are 
obligated to supply information about their non-self-governing territories. Salazar, the Portuguese 
prime minister at the time, changed the Portuguese constitution and renamed the Portuguese colonies 
“provinces” (Brinkley & Griffiths, 1999). Thus, the difference in opinion is if this case is direct 
deterrence or extended deterrence encounter depends on if one regards Goa being a province of 
Portugal as being so because Salazar had it changed in the constitution. Portugal was defending its 
home territory thus basically Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein agree that it’s a deterrence 
failure, the disagreement lies in it being direct or extended deterrence. Goa officially was a Portuguese 
province which makes the defence of Portugal not an act of defending the protégé but on defending its 
own home territory. 
 
Turkey (attacker) vs. Cyprus (protégé) and Greece (defender) in 1964. 
 
This case is described by Lebow and Stein as the strongest immediate extended deterrence case in the 
dataset. Archbishop Makarios III, who was the president of Cyprus in November 1963, proposed at 
that time a number of constitutional changes in pursuance of reducing the political power of the 
Turkish community in Cyprus, this proposal caused a lot of violence and riots by the Turkish 
community (Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.). Huth and Russett state that Greece practiced deterrence 
to protect the Turkish Cypriotic community while Lebow and Stein state that not Greece but Turkey 
actually practiced deterrence and later on compellence to protect the Turkish Cypriotic community. 
Turkey told the American ambassador that Turkey would try an invasion on Cyprus in order to protect 
the Turkish Cypriotic community unless there would be a cease-fire under supervision. This threat 
didn’t work but the next threat by Turkey however did have a good effect. Turkey threatened to 
intervene unless the attacks on the Turkish community would come to a halt within the next 24 hours. 
This did work but this success was for the short term. Turkey again contemplated an invasion until the 
United States got air of the idea and informed Turkey that all military aid for Turkey would be 
suspended and that there would not be any American support for Turkey if the Soviet Union would 
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intervene. The aid Turkey and Greece were both receiving was based on the Truman plan in the battle 
of the United States against communism  (Ehrlich, 1974). This worked and Turkey didn’t intervene 
until July when Greece wanted to get rid of as many Turkish areas on Cyprus as possible. Because of 
this intervention, the Greek Cypriots decided to accept the cease-fire. According to Lebow and Stein, 
Huth and Russett completely leave out the United States and don’t acknowledge the fact that the 
U.S.A. deterred Turkey twice.  
Lebow and Stein took a closer look into this case and because of their close analysis of this case, 
Lebow and Stein were able to see that the roles hadn’t been assessed correctly. The act of deterrence 
was indeed successful when Turkey is the defender instead of the attacker mainly because Greece 
didn’t accomplish its objectives. However so, it remains very strange according to Lebow and Stein 
that Huth and Russett have left out the United States in this case because of the relevant role they 
played in this case by stopping Turkey from attacking (Lebow and Stein, 1990). 
 
The difference in coding 
 
Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein have a very different way of analysing the cases. While Huth 
and Russett have focused on creating an expected-utility model to test cases on and Lebow and Stein 
have focused on reclassifying the cases that Huth and Russett have coded using case-by-case analysis 
and thus having a more qualitative approach instead of the quantitative.  
In analysing these few cases I have highlighted in this research, I find that Huth and Russett were 
focused on the outcomes of the cases while Lebow and Stein looked more carefully into the subjects at 
times causing them to code several cases in several phases. The question what one encounter is 
depends on the subjectivity of the researchers, for example Huth and Russett didn’t divide the case 
concerning Germany and Czechoslovakia into two cases because the outcome eventually was 
deterrence failure whereas Lebow and Stein separated the cases into success and failure (Herring, 
1995) (Lebow and Stein, 1990). Furthermore, when looking at the analysed cases, the fact that Lebow 
and Stein stated that the United States shouldn’t have been left out of the case concerning Cyprus, 
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Turkey and Greece, in this case there were several encounters while Huth and Russett have only 
analysed one (Lebow and Stein). On top of this, it’s difficult to properly code cases when there’s an 
insufficient amount of evidence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research has been to find out whether the difference between qualitative and 
quantitative research can be point out as the cause of the different outcomes in the studies about 
extended immediate deterrence conducted by Huth and Russett on one hand and Lebow and Stein on 
the other. In order to find this out, case studies were conducted. Three cases both sets of researchers 
agreed on and the other six they disagreed on. By first looking at the common ground, I´d hoped to 
establish some basis on which they both agreed and from which both could have worked. I tried to 
look into the reasons why the cases were coded in a certain way and I tried to find out if the different 
coding was due to the different research strategies or for example because of the haziness of the 
definitions of deterrence, compellence, extended deterrence et cetera.  
As stated before, the first three cases that were looked into, were cases on which both sets of 
researchers agreed. All three cases were deterrence failure which means that the defender didn’t mount 
a threat credible enough to stop the attacker from using military force and there were more than 200-
250 fatalities. All three cases, Germany (attacker) vs. France (protégé) and Britain and Russia 
(defenders), Germany (attacker) vs. Poland (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders) and China 
(attacker) vs. Vietnam (protégé) and USSR (defender) eventually led to big wars. There’s a lot of 
information available about this subject so with all information available, all intentions and strategies 
are on the table too. Thus, the amount of information can help the coding process and this could also 
be a part of the cause of the difference in the other outcomes. Furthermore Lebow and Stein have 
pointed out that Huth and Russett regard mounting a threat to attack as having the intention to attack 
but they point out that there’s a difference between bluffing and actually having the intention to attack. 
This can be an important factor that could cause different outcomes in classifications.   
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Then the cases the researchers disagreed on were analysed. The case of Germany (attacker) vs. 
Czechoslovakia (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders). I do not agree with Lebow and Stein 
that the British and French have successfully deterred Germany as the Germans eventually did execute 
an attack. The Germans were deterred for a short while but eventually they attacked and proceeded to 
go to war.  
Another that was looked into was the case between India (attacker) vs. Goa (protégé) and Portugal 
(defender) in 1961. The difficulty in this case lies in the fact that Portugal made Goa a province of 
theirs on paper due to the contents of the UN Charter, this makes it officially a province of Portugal 
even though the reality might have been different. Lebow and Stein have coded this one correctly  
Another analysed case concerns Turkey (attacker) vs. Cyprus (protégé) and Greece (defender) in 1964. 
In this case, I conclude that Greece should be listed as the attacker not as the defender and Turkey 
should be the defender instead of the attacker. Furthermore, the role of the United States should also 
be included more seen as they have played a major part in this case. The roles were improperly 
identified and also could have seen Turkey as the attacker and the USA as the defender.  
The next case is the Soviet Union (defender) vs. West Berlin and West Germany (protégés) and 
United States (defender) in 1948/1949. Due to the unavailability of a lot of data on this case, it’s 
difficult to code this one properly. Therefore, its label should be ‘insufficient evidence to code’ and the 
decision to leave it out of the dataset was a good one as it only could have led to conclusions that may 
not have been correct at all.   
The next analysis was conducted on the case on Panama (attacker), Costa Rica (protégé) and the 
United States (defender) in 1921. The roles in this case were improperly identified too as Panama 
should be seen as the protégé and Costa Rica as the attacker, United States had promised to protect 
Panama in a treaty but in the end weren’t willing to hold up their end of the deal and didn’t intervene 
when Costa Rica occupied the Panamanian village Coto.  
The last analysis conducted was on Germany (attacker), Venezuela (protégé) and US (defender) in 
1902/1903. This case concerned Britain and Germany who both had yet to receive major repayments 
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from Venezuela while the U.S.A. interfered in defence of Venezuela, causing Germany and Britain to 
back off, thus making it a successful deterrence encounter.   
 
When analysing these cases and looking at the work of both Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein, 
it’s clear that the researches had a different objective when analysing these cases. As stated before, 
Huth and Russett were looking to set up an expected-utility model which could be used to test other 
cases while Lebow and Stein executed a case-by-case analysis. One was focused on the outcomes 
while the other was looking for explanations, causes and consequences. Because Lebow and Stein 
were looking to find causes and consequences in their cases and wanted to divide cases into more 
encounters, their results immediately differed from Huth and Russett as they have mostly analysed 
only one encounter per case. This all derives from their own perspectives, Huth and Russett 
approached this using a social scientific perspective offering a model to test cases on instead of doing 
close analysis on cases individually like Lebow and Stein do using their historical perspective.   
As Fearon also stated, the differences in their definitions are so small that these differences cannot 
cause the big differences in coding. To answer my research question ‘Can the different views of Huth 
and Russett on one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other explain the differences in outcomes in their 
research on deterrence encounters?’ my answer would be that it could partly explain the differences in 
coding.  Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein have both had different perspectives thus causing 
them to have a different objective whilst researching. Huth and Russett were looking to set up this 
expected-utility model while Lebow and Stein started to recode Huth and Russett’s dataset. Huth and 
Russett were focused on the outcomes of the cases while Lebow and Stein tried to find out the causes 
and consequences behind the outcomes. However, the coding of deterrence cases is a difficult task as 
not all information is available thus not giving researchers a clear view on intentions of countries 
involved, this could also be partly the cause of the huge differences between the two researches. On 
top of this, the coding of these cases requires a lot of reading and thus this could be a semantic issue as 
well because it also depends heavily on how researchers interpret the texts available.   
The different views aren’t the only explanation for the differences in coding by these researchers as a 
lot of other issues like information and interpretations.  
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